Practical Reasons for Belief Without Stakes by Laskowski, N. G. & Hernandez, Shawn
 
Practical Reasons for Belief Without Stakes1 
Shawn Hernandez and N. G. Laskowski 
Forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy  
Please cite published version when available. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Epistemologists are dissatisfied with traditional epistemological tools. It’s not uncommon to hear 
that truth, belief, and other familiar conditions on knowledge do little justice to intuitions in a 
wide range of cases where getting things right matters practically. Consider the following widely 
discussed pair of cases. 
Low Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their 
paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending 
bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are 
very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Hannah remembers the 
bank being open on Saturday morning a few weeks ago, so she says, 
‘Fortunately, it will be open tomorrow, so we can just come back.’ In fact, 
Hannah is right – the bank will be open on Saturday. 
 
1 The first draft of this paper was written by N. G. Laskowski in 2012. It sat on a hard drive, forgotten, for the next 
eight years until Shawn Hernandez took an interest in the paper’s topic. After re-working the paper’s main ideas 
collaboratively, Shawn Hernandez revised the original draft significantly, especially in response to feedback from 
three different referees, transforming it into the version you see today. Thanks to Mark Schroeder for extensive 
feedback on this paper’s earliest ancestors. Thanks to Nathan Robert Howard for helpful recent feedback. Thanks to 
the referees and editors at Analytic Philosophy for helping us bring this paper to publication. 
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High Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their 
paychecks. Since their mortgage payment is due on Sunday, they have very 
little in their account, and they are on the brink of foreclosure, it is very 
important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. But as they drive 
past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often 
are on Friday afternoons. Hannah remembers the bank being open on 
Saturday morning a few weeks ago, so she says, ‘Fortunately, it will be open 
tomorrow, so we can just come back.’ In fact, Hannah is right – the bank 
will be open on Saturday. 
In both cases, Hannah has the same evidence that the bank was open on Saturday and the 
same true belief that the bank will be open on Saturday. Intuitively, however, Hannah’s true belief 
amounts to knowledge only in Low Stakes. Since the two cases contain only one salient difference 
– it matters practically in High Stakes that Hannah deposits her mortgage payment successfully by 
Sunday – some philosophers have become attracted to the pragmatic encroachment thesis, the idea, 
roughly, that knowledge in some way depends on the practical stakes associated with getting things 
right.2 
 Of course, while many philosophers have become attracted to the idea of pragmatic 
encroachment, especially since the turn of the 21st century, still many others have not. Among 
those whom resist pragmatic encroachment, some base their resistance on explicit and principled 
 
2 There are many ways of prespecifying the basic idea of pragmatic encroachment. This paper will be concerned with 
only one such precification. See Brown (2008) and Kim (2017) for helpful surveys. 
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argumentation.3 But for many others, including ourselves for some time, resistance to pragmatic 
encroachment is attributable to the fact that it’s simply not easy to see how knowledge even could 
be influenced by practical considerations.4 Recently, however, Mark Schroeder makes a case for 
pragmatic encroachment by arguing how it could be true.5 His idea is, in brief, that knowledge 
entails a kind of epistemic rationality and that there is pragmatic encroachment on it and hence 
knowledge.6  
 In § 1, we discuss Schroeder’s intriguing idea in detail. Articulating his view at a high 
resolution reveals a challenge for it that is put on full display in § 2. In § 3, we argue that our 
challenge can be met with an amendment that makes the promising but controversial view 
proposed by Schroeder even more controversial. In brief, in addition to knowledge being sensitive 
to the non-evidential practical stakes associated with getting things right, we argue that proponents 
of pragmatic encroachment are under pressure to acknowledge that knowledge is sensitive to 
another kind of non-evidential practical consideration – a non-stakes-based, non-evidential practical 
consideration about the evidence one already possesses. Proponents of pragmatic encroachment 
will likely view this relatively neglected class of practical consideration as a welcome development 
of their research program, whereas detractors will view it as all the more reason to be skeptical.  
 
 
3 See, inter alia, Berker (2018). 
4  Of course, some more imaginative epistemologists than ourselves have had less trouble seeing how practical 
considerations might influence knowledge, including, inter alia, Grimm (2011). 
5 See Schroeder (2012, 2021). Our paper engages with Schroeder (2012) primarily. We have not yet had the chance 
to work through Schroder (2021) closely, but it seems to us from our limited engagement with it that our core ideas 
are still relevant. 
6 See Leary (2017) for an alternative defense of pragmatic encroachment on which practical considerations make one 
more responsive to one’s epistemic reasons. 
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1. THE POSSIBILITY OF PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT 
Cases such as Low and High Stakes are useful in sorting out which kinds of factors are related to 
knowledge for the mundane reason that such cases tend to elicit clear intuitions about the successes 
or failures of their protagonists to acquire knowledge in scenarios containing different kinds of 
factors. As suggested above, intuitions about Low and High Stakes suggest that both epistemic 
and practical factors are important for an assessment of an agent’s epistemic features. Nevertheless, 
there is strong motivation to resist including practical factors in epistemic evaluations – it is hardly 
a straightforward matter to determine the relationship of practical factors to the standards of 
epistemic evaluation. Indeed, it’s not at all obvious how practical factors could be relevant to a 
central epistemological notion – truth.  
Recognizing that it is difficult to determine how practical factors might affect knowledge 
directly, Schroeder (2012) provides an account of how practical factors might indirectly affect it, 
by developing the idea that practical factors affect rationality.7 This is a promising strategy because 
it allows Schroeder to help himself to a plausible assumption about knowledge: An agent knows p 
only if it is epistemically rational for the agent to believe it.8  With this assumption in place, 
Schroeder suggests that the difference in stakes between Low and High Stakes is contributing to 
a difference in the status of Hannah’s epistemic rationality and hence contributing to a difference 
 
7 Schroeder (2012: 268) notes: “Although the pragmatic encroachment thesis is first and foremost a thesis about 
knowledge, I am not going to provide a picture of how practical factors defeat knowledge directly. Rather, what I am 
going to focus on for most of this paper, is how Hannah’s belief that the stakes are high in her situation could make 
it fail to be rational for her to believe that the bank will be open on Saturday”. Schroeder develops his views on these 
matters further in recent work (2021: 129–187). See also, especially, Schroeder (2021: Ch. 6-8).  
8  Ibid “…I will be relying on what I take to be a highly plausible assumption about how knowledge and rationality 
are related to one another: in particular, I will be assuming that you know p only if it is rational for you to believe p”.  
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in what she knows.9 Schroeder suggests that all it takes to figure out how practical factors affect 
knowledge is to figure out how practical factors affect the epistemic rationality of belief. 
Using claims about rationality to assess the question of whether pragmatic factors encroach 
on a belief’s propositional justification, Schroeder helps himself to another assumption: It is 
epistemically rational for S to believe p just in case S has at least as much epistemic reason to 
believe p as to not believe p.10 With this assumption in place, Schroeder then suggests that practical 
factors can contribute to an agent having at least as much epistemic reason to believe p as to not 
believe p on the further claim that practical facts can be epistemic reasons.11 If practical facts can be 
epistemic reasons, then the stakes might be a reason that make it epistemically irrational for 
Hannah to believe p in High Stakes, by tipping the balance of reasons against believing p. And so, 
as it would be epistemically irrational for Hannah to believe p, Hannah would not know p. 
Schroeder’s ideas illuminate how it could be that knowledge depends on practical considerations 
– it illuminates the idea of pragmatic encroachment.  
 
9 Schroeder (2012) claims that knowledge entails the kind of epistemic rationality that excludes the sense in which it 
is rational to believe in God’s existence in Pascal’s Wager, acknowledging that this characterization of epistemic 
rationality is suggestive. In an interesting recent discussion, Worsnip (2020) argues that proponents of pragmatic 
encroachment cannot be “moderate” in this way. As we’ll see, the arguments of this paper also suggest that the best 
versions of pragmatic encroachment are less moderate than they’re typically taken to be.  
10 It’s natural to wonder whether this assumption concerns ex ante or ex post rationality. S’s attitude d is is ex ante 
rational iff the balance of reasons support S having d, whereas S’s attitude d is ex post rational iff the balance of reasons 
support S having d and S’s having d is based on those reasons. This distinction is best understood as a generalization 
of the distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality. S’s belief p is propositionally rational iff the balance 
of reasons support S believing p, whereas S’s belief p is doxastically rational iff the balance of reasons support S 
believing p and S believes p on that basis. Schroeder’s assumption that it is epistemically rational for S to believe p just 
in case S has at least as much epistemic reason to believe p as to not believe p is most charitably interpreted as pertaining 
to ex ante rationality, since it is arguably false in the sufficiency direction on the ex post rationality interpretation. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging us to address these important distinctions.  
11 This isn’t quite the way Schroeder (2012: 274) puts it. He says that the kind of facts that can be epistemic reasons 
are those “that are of the right kind to play a role in affecting epistemic rationality.” We put it in the less general way 




Of course, however, there are several concerns that one might have about the proposal. 
Addressing the following three will further clarify the view. First, one might doubt whether 
practical facts can be epistemic reasons that contribute to the epistemic rationality of believing p. 
After all, practical facts can’t tell us whether p or ~p; that is, it’s hard to see how practical facts can 
be reasons to think p is true or false. Schroeder (2012: 272) observes, however, that believing p 
and believing ~p do not exhaust an epistemic agent’s available options: such an agent might also 
withhold on p, and it is far easier to see how practical facts might be reasons for this. After all, the 
fact that one does not have much evidence for p or that further evidence is forthcoming seem like 
just the kind of reasons to not yet make up one’s mind about the truth of p. 
 The second concern is that many epistemologists have long held that evidence is the only 
kind of thing that can be an epistemic reason. But, according to Schroeder (2012: 276), as long as 
we acknowledge that there can be epistemic reason to withhold on a proposition, then we have to 
admit that there can be epistemic reasons that can’t be evidence. This is because evidence that 
supports p is an epistemic reason to believe p and evidence that supports ~p is an epistemic reason 
to believe ~p. Thus, if there can be an epistemic reason to withhold on p, such a reason can’t be 
evidence. This argument from Schroeder suggests that some epistemic reasons can’t be of an 
evidential kind of fact.12 And if this argument is right then it opens the door to admitting that 
other kinds of facts can be epistemic reasons. 
 
12  However, it’s worth noting that there are several views of the nature of reasons on which the conclusion of 
Schroeder’s argument arguably does not follow. For example, on the intriguing Reasons as Evidence view developed by 
Kearns and Star (2008, 2009), to be a reason for an agent to phi is to be evidence that the agent ought to phi. Against 
the background of such a view, while it could be that evidence that supports p is a reason to believe p and evidence 
that supports ~p is a reason to believe ~p, an anonymous referee points outs that it arguably doesn’t follow that an 
epistemic reason to withhold can’t be evidence, since it could be that one has evidence that one ought to withhold. 
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 The responses above purport to show that non-evidential practical facts can be epistemic 
reasons by bearing on the epistemic rationality of the cognitive activity of withholding. But this 
claim seems to depend on a substantive assumption, namely, that facts bearing on the rationality 
of one’s actions, including the epistemic rationality of one’s cognitive activities, are epistemic 
reasons. The third and more fundamental concern with the proposal on offer from Schroeder is 
that the truth of this assumption is far from obvious.13 Indeed, in the wake of Dancy’s (2004: 
Chapter 2) highly influential arguments, it is common to assume that only some facts bearing on 
the rationality of one’s actions are reasons. Consider an oversimplified but still illustrative example. 
While the fact that we promised to provide comments on a friend’s draft is a reason to do so, the 
fact that we can provide comments, a fact that clearly bears on the rationality of my promise, is not 
a reason to provide comments; rather, it’s a fact that merely enables the fact that we promised to 
provide comments to be a reason. Similarly, one might think, while the practical fact that we do 
not have evidence for p or evidence for ~p bears on the rationality of withholding, it’s not obvious 
that this practical fact is an epistemic reason to withhold.  
 There isn’t enough space to fully adjudicate the truth of the claim that only some facts 
bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s cognitive activities are epistemic reasons. But we 
submit that the following three responses suffice to make Schroeder’s reliance on the claim 
defensible. The picture on offer from Dancy is one on which only some facts bearing on the 
rationality of one’s actions are reasons, because it’s possible for a fact to play a reason-like role in a 
normative explanation, such as enabling other facts to be reasons, without itself being a reason. As 
some have observed, support for such a picture is primarily motivated by cases, especially cases like 
 
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.  
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the aforementioned example in which the mere fact that we can provide comments enables our 
promise to be a reason but isn’t itself a reason.14  
 But there are doubts about whether such cases lend this kind of support for Dancy’s view. 
Fogal (2016: 101) offers several similar examples but has very different reactions to them. The fact 
that one can help someone, as Fogal points out, seems like a reason to do so. Or, as Fogal observes, 
the mere fact that one can ask Obama a question upon running into him seems like a reason to do 
so, given that it’s rare that one ever has the opportunity to ask Obama anything.15 To be clear, 
we’re not claiming that these facts concerning one’s ability to do something are obviously reasons 
to perform the relevant actions. Our claim is just that one of the main forms of support for the 
view on offer from Dancy doesn’t obviously lend strong support to the view. In other words, 
because support from the cases is up for grabs, as it were, we shouldn’t treat any view in this arena 
as the default view.  
 Now consider a second response, a dialectical one that sets up another more substantive 
response below. While it’s true that Dancy’s perspective on these issues has been influential, there 
are other important perspectives that are worth taking seriously. For example, Schroeder is 
sympathetic to the “Reasons First” idea that, roughly, reasons explain all other normative facts, e.g. 
that there cannot be a change in the normative status of an action without a change in the set of 
reasons bearing on the action.16 But views such as Dancy’s, on which facts like enablers that play 
reason-like roles that are nevertheless not themselves reasons, allow for changes in normative status 
 
14 See Bader (2016) 
15 See also Setiya (2014: Section 2) 
16 Dancy is often cited as a proponent of the reasons-first program but for reasons that should be clear in this paragraph 
and especially the next, we don’t think that’s entirely apt.  
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without changes in sets of reasons. The conclusion to draw from the perspective of a reasons-firster 
is not that reasons fail to explain all other normative facts, but rather that there aren’t such things 
as enablers or other reason-like things that aren’t reasons, such as attenuators, intensifiers, and so 
on.  
 Third, even if it turns out that our intuitions about cases support the view that facts can 
play reason-like roles without themselves being reasons, and hence that there’s more intuitive 
support for the related claim that only some facts bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s 
cognitive activities are epistemic reasons, we submit that there is strong theoretical reason to reject 
these claims. Suppose, to take a version of one of Dancy’s examples, that one of us, Shawn, reasons 
from the fact that (i) I promised to provide comments, (ii) My promise wasn’t made under duress, 
(iii) I can provide comments, and (iv) There is no greater reason to do it, to the conclusion that (v) 
I ought to provide comments. Dancy would say that what explains why Shawn ought to provide 
comments is that the fact that Shawn promised to provide comments is decisive reason to do so, 
which is enabled to be a reason by the fact that Shawn can provide comments. Thus, for Dancy, 
there are at least two kinds of entities that figure in this normative explanation – reasons and 
enablers.17  
 However, on a different explanation, one that might be offered by a reasons-firster like 
Schroeder, there are several facts that are reasons that explain why Shawn ought to provide 
comments, such as the fact that he promised and the fact that he can do so. But while there are 
several facts that are reasons in this normative explanation, there is only one kind of entity that 
explains Shawn’s obligation – reasons. So, by a suitably interpreted ontological version of Occam’s 
 
17 For arguments in a similar spirit, see Howard (forthcoming). 
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Razor, we ought to reject the view that facts can play reason-like roles in normative explanations 
without themselves being reasons. Thus, it’s not obviously true that only some facts bearing on the 
rationality of one’s activities are epistemic reasons. Thus, it’s defensible to assume, as Schroeder is 
plausibly interpreted as assuming, that facts bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s cognitive 
activities are epistemic reasons.  
 We could continue clarifying and motivating the view of pragmatic encroachment 
proposed by Schroeder by defending it against still more objections. But the best advertisement 
for it is that it yields plausible predictions about the kind of cases of interest in this paper. Recall 
that much of the concern about whether pragmatic encroachment is true comes from worries about 
how it could be so. So, let’s apply the view on offer from Schroeder to another variation of Hannah’s 
original situation to remove any lingering mystery. 
High Stakes, Strong Evidence: This case is just like High Stakes, except 
that instead of remembering the bank being open on Saturday 
morning a few weeks ago, Hannah passes a sign on the front of the 
bank reading ‘Open Seven Days a Week’. She then exclaims, 
‘Fortunately, the bank will be open tomorrow, so we can just come 
back.’ In fact, Hannah is right – the bank will be open on Saturday. 
 Although the stakes in High Stakes, Strong Evidence (‘HSSE’, from here on) are no less high 
than the stakes in High Stakes, and so it is, intuitively, no less difficult to acquire knowledge, it 
seems clear that Hannah knows that the bank will be open on Saturday. Schroeder’s proposed view 
predicts and explains this result. It is epistemically rational for Hannah to believe p and so Hannah 
can have knowledge of it. What makes Hannah’s belief epistemically rational is that, even though 
the high stakes are a reason to not believe p, Hannah’s perceptual evidence is a weightier epistemic 
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reason that tips the balance in favor of believing p. By observing how the view accommodates the 
intuitive influence of the stakes but also the intuitive strength of the evidence, the results from 
HSSE lends further support for it. 
 Having outlined the view, rebutted several objections to it, and demonstrated its predictive 
and explanatory power, we are now in a position to assess the relative tradeoffs associated with 
adopting it. Despite the attractiveness of the view on offer from Schroeder, we’ll suggest that it is 
vulnerable to a problem. 
 
2. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Philosophers embrace the basic idea of the pragmatic encroachment thesis from a variety of 
different motivations.18 One motivation is that it captures the intuition that it is in some way 
harder to have knowledge in cases where there is a lot at stake.19 For instance, while Hannah’s 
evidence from memory is enough to rationalize belief in Low Stakes, it is not enough to do so in 
High Stakes – there is more we expect Hannah to have to do to have knowledge when there is 
more at stake, such as gather more evidence. The view proposed by Schroeder respects this 
intuition by allowing that practical facts can be reasons that count against belief and hence raise 
the bar on the epistemic rationality of belief.  
 In HSSE, it seems like perceiving a sign that says ‘Open Seven Days a Week’ makes it 
epistemically rational to believe that the bank will be open and hence know that the bank will be 
 
18 For example, Hawthorne (2004) argues that something like it is necessary to avoid the skeptical threat from puzzles 
about lottery cases and Weatherson (2005) thinks that an appeal to the role of practical factors will figure in our best 
account of the nature of belief.  
19 Stanley (2005) is directly concerned with accounting for our intuitions in the kinds of cases we’ve been considering.  
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open. As we saw, the view proposed by Schroeder predicts this result. But on this view, it’s also 
possible that even the very best evidence one can have in support of p might fail to make it 
epistemically rational to believe p if there are practical facts that are sufficiently weighty reasons 
against believing it. It’s not difficult to construct cases in which evidence doesn’t rationalize belief 
when it intuitively should if we admit that practical facts can be epistemic reasons. Consider 
another variation on Hannah’s original scenario. 
Higher Stakes, Strong Evidence: This case is just like High Stakes, 
Strong Evidence except that if Hannah fails to deposit her check on 
time, not only will the bank foreclose her house but the IRS will 
imprison Hannah for failing to pay on time and the mafia will break 
her kneecaps for failing to pay back her gambling debts. Again, 
Hannah passes a sign on the front of the bank reading ‘Open Seven 
Days a Week’ and exclaims, ‘Fortunately, the bank will be open 
tomorrow, so we can just come back.’ In fact, Hannah is right – the 
bank will be open on Saturday. 
 Despite the exceptionally high stakes it still seems as though Hannah knows that the bank 
will be open on Saturday. But if we are to take the claim that practical facts can be epistemic 
reasons seriously, the view under consideration does not yield this prediction. Surely it is 
epistemically irrational to believe p with so much at stake if it’s ever epistemically irrational to 
believe p because of the stakes. We submit, however, that this is an unintuitive prediction. That 
practical facts can count as reasons that trump evidence in this way, even extremely strong evidence 
of the sort that Hannah possesses in the above cases, is a bad result – one that takes the intuitive 
data from cases like Low and High Stakes too seriously. While it is intuitive to think that practical 
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facts could make it harder to have knowledge, it is unintuitive to think that such facts could make 
it that much harder.20 
 Why is the view under consideration subject to this kind of worry? One natural guess is 
that the view is vulnerable to this worry because of its commitment to the controversial claim that 
practical facts can be epistemic reasons, i.e. its commitment to the claim that there can be epistemic 
reasons of a non-evidential kind. If this is right, then this worry also has an obvious but perfectly 
natural solution to it: Drop the claim that practical facts can be epistemic reasons. But to pursue 
this solution would be to give up what is arguably the most distinctive and interesting component 
of Schroeder’s proposal for understanding how pragmatic encroachment could be true.  
 Fortunately, there is a route available to Schroeder for addressing the worry in a way that 
preserves the distinguishing features of the view. In fact, the solution that we’ll offer in the next 
and final section involves doubling down on the claim that practical facts can be epistemic reasons, 
by extending Schroeder’s underlying idea that there can be epistemic reasons of a non-evidential 
kind. What we’ll suggest is that in addition to stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons, there 
is another non-evidential but non-stakes-involving kind of practical epistemic reason available for 
rationalizing Hannah’s belief in HSSE+. This neglected kind of practical epistemic reason reveals 
itself upon closer inspection of the aforementioned motivation for the pragmatic encroachment 




20 Several others express a similar sentiment over the course of defending various views about the relationship between 
practical considerations and knowledge, including Davis (2015: 436), Dinges (2016: 2586–2587), Fantl and McGrath 
(2009: 188–19), Fassio (2020: 849–850), and Howard (2020: 2232) 
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3. THE VARIETY OF PRACTICAL EPISTEMIC REASONS 
The lesson of HSSE+ is that it is a constraint on a plausible theory of pragmatic encroachment 
that evidential considerations are strongly rationalizing. In other words, while practical epistemic 
reasons might have the capacity to influence epistemic rationality and hence knowledge, evidential 
epistemic reasons must have a relatively stronger influence to do so on any plausible version of the 
pragmatic encroachment thesis. Our question now is whether there’s a way for the view proposed 
by Schroeder to satisfy this constraint while yielding correct predictions about the cases of interest 
in this paper. We’ll now argue that there is such a way, but that it comes with a potential cost.  
 To begin to see how the view on offer from Schroeder can satisfy this constraint, it is 
instructive to keep in mind an important motivation for countenancing an epistemic role for 
practical facts. Recall that many philosophers find the pragmatic encroachment thesis attractive in 
part because it helps capture the intuition that it is in some way harder to have knowledge in cases 
where there is a lot at stake. That is, many philosophers think there is more that an epistemic agent 
must do to know p, such as gather more evidence, when the stakes associated with being wrong 
about p are sufficiently high. In cases where getting things right matters practically, withholding 
is often the uniquely rational epistemological response for this very sort of reason, because 
withholding is a state that characteristically functions to keep deliberation open, such that more 
evidence can be gathered before deciding whether p.21  
 But there are also cases where getting things right matters practically, where withholding 
is often not the uniquely rational epistemological response. This is also due to the characteristic 
function of withholding – it is often not rational to withhold on a proposition precisely because 
 
21 Schroeder (2021: 180–186) elaborates on this point. 
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withholding is a state that doesn’t settle deliberation. One need not look any further than scenarios 
where there are high stakes associated with indecision and consequently inaction to see that it is 
frequently irrational to keep deliberation open by withholding judgment.  
 Importantly, however, while there are scenarios where withholding can be irrational 
because there are high-stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons associated with indecision and 
inaction against it, there are also scenarios where withholding can be irrational but not because of 
the stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons associated with indecision and inaction. Which 
scenarios? Those scenarios very much like HSSE+, where the practical fact that Hannah already 
has the very best evidence available and consequently the practical fact that better evidence is 
unlikely to be forthcoming.  
 Unlike the intuition that epistemic agents ought to withhold and seek more evidence to 
have knowledge in high-stakes cases, the intuition that epistemic agents ought not to withhold and 
not seek more evidence to have knowledge in high-stakes cases hasn’t been widely acknowledged.22 
But if we recognize the former intuition as legitimate it is hard to see how we could avoid 
recognizing the latter as legitimate, too. If it’s right to think that withholding can be epistemically 
rational because it functions to keep deliberation open when further deliberation might prove 
useful, then it is natural to think that withholding can be epistemically irrational when deliberating 
further would be pointless. 
 These observations about the characteristic functioning of withholding allow us to see how 
the claim that there are non-stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons constituted by practical 
facts about our evidence helps views like the one proposed by Schroeder capture the rationalizing 
 
22 Worsnip (2020: 13) is an exception.  
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force of evidential considerations. The idea is that, generally speaking, each time an agent acquires 
an evidential epistemic reason supporting believing that p, the agent also acquires a practical 
epistemic reason against withholding on p.23 This is because, in general, each time the agent 
acquires a new piece of evidence for p it makes it less likely that further evidence for ~p will be 
forthcoming, at least on the assumption that evidence availability is finite.24 
 Less abstractly, in HSSE+, when Hannah sees the sign reading ‘Open Seven Days a Week’, 
she acquires an evidential epistemic reason to believe that the bank will be open. Moreover, this 
very evidential epistemic reason carries with it, as it were, another epistemic reason against 
withholding on p, namely, the non-stakes-involving practical epistemic reason that further 
evidence for ~p is unlikely to be forthcoming. While the costs associated with being wrong about 
the bank’s operating hours still provide strong stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons to 
withhold on p, the combined weight of the evidential epistemic reason and the non-stakes-
involving practical epistemic reasons plausibly tip the balance of reasons against withholding. By 
recognizing that evidential epistemic reasons are accompanied by non-stakes-involving practical 
epistemic reasons that are constituted by practical facts about the evidence one does and does not 
 
23 We say ‘generally speaking’ because there are recherche cases where receiving evidence begets more evidence. For 
example, a defense attorney might be disposed to gather a new item of evidence supporting their client’s innocence 
for every item of evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt that the prosecution brings forth. We restrict the scope of 
the principle that we’re floating to exclude cases where there are explicit procedural norms governing evidence 
gathering among agents. Such cases seem to us to require separate treatment. Thanks to anonymous referee for stress 
testing our proposal.   
24 Further evidence for ~p is less likely to be forthcoming because any further evidence at all, for p or ~p, is less likely 
to be forthcoming, again, at least on the natural assumption that the available evidence is finite. The sense in which 
such evidence is not any more likely to be forthcoming is that there is less of it to be discovered. It is a practical fact 
that there is less evidence for p or ~p to be discovered because such a fact does not constitute a reason to believe p nor 
a reason to believe ~p and it does not constitute a reason to believe p or believe ~p because it does not indicate whether 
p is true nor does it indicate whether ~p is true. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing for clarification.  
 
 17 
yet possess, we can capture the intuition that evidential epistemic reasons have a stronger 
rationalizing force than stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons.25 
 Addressing the following two concerns with the view will help further clarify it. One 
concern about this proposal is that it doesn’t locate the strong rationalizing force of evidential 
considerations in those very considerations themselves. There’s nothing about the nature of 
evidence itself, on this proposal, that helps the view proposed by Schroeder make correct 
predictions about HSSE+. Rather, it’s the non-stakes-involving practical facts about one’s evidence 
that accompany our evidence that’s helping the view make the correct predictions. But on one way 
of understanding the challenge posed in the previous section, it’s the challenge of capturing the 
intuition that the strong rationalizing force of evidence flows from the essential nature of evidence. 
 There are several clarificatory replies that are worth making. First, epistemologists have 
been paying increasing attention to the issue of whether ‘evidence’ is even univocal, not just in 
different contexts of use, but in the context of use in philosophy.26 But if this line of thought is on 
the right track then the challenge of the previous section is not best interpreted as one involving 
our intuitions about the essential nature of evidence. Second, relatedly, we submit that the 
challenge posed by HSSE+ is best understood as the extensional challenge of predicting that 
Hannah knows that the bank will be open, rather than the challenge of offering a particular kind 
 
25 An anonymous referee suggests that this proposal paints an implausible picture of how and which reasons figure in 
deliberation, e.g., that it’s implausible to imagine Hannah considering the high stakes, the high-quality evidence that 
the bank is open, and then her non-stakes-based reasons that we suggest tip the balance in favor of believing in HSSE+. 
But more would need to be said to make this complaint stick. First, we simply don’t share the referee’s judgement that 
the proposal paints an implausible picture of deliberation. Second, and more substantively, the proposal can be thought 
of as the claim that non-stakes-based reasons are objective reasons for Hannah, i.e. reasons in favor of believing 
whether or not Hannah is aware of them. Consequently, there’s no simple way to infer from the proposal that it distorts 
how and which reasons figure in deliberation. 
26 Wedgwood (manuscript) 
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of explanation of such knowledge. After all, if one is worried about using practical facts to play a 
role in explaining knowledge, as proponents of pragmatic encroachment do, one does need to 
construct any case at all to bring out such a worry – it’s right there in the name, pragmatic 
encroachment.  
 Another concern about the proposal is that it can be challenging to discern exactly which 
kinds of practical facts are serving as epistemic reasons against withholding. After all, in cases like 
HSSE+ in which it could be that there are practical facts about one’s evidence serving as non-
stakes-involving epistemic reasons against withholding, one might plausibly claim instead that 
there’s a stakes-involving practical fact involving the cost associated with indecision and 
consequently inaction serving as an epistemic reason for Hannah not to withhold. More generally, 
for any case where it looks like there might be a practical fact about evidence serving as an epistemic 
reason against withholding, we can also find a stakes-involving practical fact that might be serving 
as an epistemic reason against withholding. It is no secret that withholding to deliberate further is 
almost always time-consuming and cognitively-demanding. If there’s any epistemic reason tipping 
the balance of epistemic reasons against withholding and in favor of belief in cases like HSSE+, 
one might claim that it’s likely some stakes-involving practical fact, not a non-stakes-involving 
practical fact about evidence. In other words, it could be that proponents of the view on offer from 
Schroeder don’t need to appeal to another kind of practical epistemic reason that doesn’t involve 
stakes to make the correct predictions about the cases of interest in this paper.  
 Consider the following two responses. First, the claim of this paper is not that proponents 
of the kind of pragmatic encroachment that Schroeder develops must appeal to non-stakes-
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involving practical epistemic reasons to salvage the view.27 Rather, it’s that making such an appeal 
is one way of doing so, one that’s especially natural for anyone sympathetic to the kind of Reasons 
First approach to normative explanation that Schroeder champions, which allows that reasons are 
fairly cheap to come by.28 Second, and more substantively, even if it’s true that there are costs 
associated with withholding that serve as stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons for Hannah 
not to do so in HSSE+, it wouldn’t follow that there aren’t facts about Hannah’s evidence that also 
serve as non-stakes-involving practical epistemic reasons against withholding. The main goal of 
this paper is to highlight the possibility that there are such facts serving as such reasons.29 
 
 
27 For an alternative proposal, see Howard (2019). 
28 See Schroeder (2007) 
29 We’ve tried to explain how it is possible to hold the view that practical considerations affect knowledge while also 
maintaining that the protagonists in cases like HSSE+ have knowledge. But an anonymous reviewer makes the 
interesting suggestion that a proponent of such an explanation might be vulnerable to a dilemma. Either they commit 
to saying that it is rational for subjects like Hannah to act on the relevant proposition even when the stakes are 
incredibly high or they commit to saying that it is irrational for the subject to act on the proposition. The former 
commitment might seem false. The latter might also seem false, because it amounts to a rejection of the plausible idea 
that there is a close connection between knowledge and action, i.e. it amounts to a rejection of a “knowledge-action 
principle” of the sort that has been defended by, inter alia, Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Hathorne and Stanley 
(2009). Indeed, not only might it be false to claim that it is irrational for a subject like Hannah to act on the relevant 
proposition, it might be considered especially awkward for proponents of pragmatic encroachment to do so, given the 
apparent fittingness of using the idea that there is a close connection between knowledge and action to motivate 
pragmatic encroachment.  
Focus on the second horn on which proponents of the sort of pragmatic encroachment that we’ve been exploring in 
this paper are committed to saying that it is irrational for a subject like Hannah to act on the relevant proposition at 
issue. Grant the reviewer’s suggestion that this amounts to a rejection of the truth of a “knowledge-action principle”. 
In response, we claim that rejecting such a principle isn’t a problem. For it is telling that in setting up the dilemma, 
no specific knowledge-action principle is mentioned. This is no accident – many different versions of such principles 
have been developed and defended and not a single one of them commands anything approaching a consensus. Indeed, 
far from commanding consensus, apparent counterexamples to such principles aren’t especially difficult to construct. 
For example, parents who strap their children into strollers know that they’re strapped in, but they often pull the straps 
again before starting to push. One of us always double-check that the front door is locked at night by pulling it, even 
though he knows that the door is locked because he saw himself turning the deadbolt a second ago. However, even if 
some knowledge-action principle were true, pragmatic encroachers could defend a version of such a principle and still 
claim that it is irrational to act on p when one knows p, by claiming that generally speaking, it’s rational to act on p 





We began this paper by suggesting that Schroeder’s otherwise attractive picture about the 
possibility of pragmatic encroachment makes knowledge too difficult to achieve in a range of 
ordinary cases. We then suggested that this problem reveals that any plausible view about 
pragmatic encroachment must find some way to respect the intuition that evidential considerations 
exert a stronger influence on epistemic rationality than practical considerations. In the final section 
of this paper, we argued that this constraint can be satisfied indirectly, by acknowledging the 
epistemic relevance of non-stakes-involving practical facts about evidential considerations – facts 
that can serve as strong epistemic reasons against withholding. The main contribution of this paper 
has been the suggestion that there might be a variety of different kinds of practical epistemic 
reasons if there are practical epistemic reasons at all. 
 The upshot of all of this for the view proposed by Schroeder depends on one’s prior taste 
for pragmatic encroachment. If one is already skeptical of the idea of non-evidential epistemic 
reasons, as many philosophers are, then our proposal will likely instill deeper skepticism. But if 
one is comfortable with the idea of non-evidential epistemic reasons, then our suggestions for 
expanding the view on offer from Schroeder might be welcome, since they seem to help the view 
satisfy an important constraint on a plausible theory of pragmatic encroachment.  
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